Networks are protected using many firewalls and encryption software's. But many of them are not sufficient and effective. Therefore an intrusion detection system (IDS) is required that monitors the network, detects misbehavior or anomalies and notifies other nodes in the network to avoid or punish the misbehaving nodes. Numerous schemes have been proposed for Intrusion Detection and Response Systems, for ad hoc networks. The ultimate goal of the security solutions for wireless networks is to provide security services, such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, and availability, to mobile users. In this paper, we examine the vulnerabilities of wireless networks and argue that we must include intrusion detection in the security architecture for mobile computing environment. We propose a mIDS (Mobile Intrusion Detection System) suitable for multi-hop ad-hoc wireless networks, which detects nodes misbehavior, anomalies in packet forwarding, such as intermediate nodes dropping or delaying packets. mIDS does rely on overhearing packet transmissions of neighboring nodes. Simple rules are designed to identify the misbehavior nodes. The proess of identyfing the misbehavior node is carried out by a special node called a monitor node. Periodically monitor node is identified in the network.
Introduction
The nature of mobility for mobile networks needs additional mechanisms for providing security. These vulnerabilities do not exist in a fixed wired network. Therefore, the traditional way of protecting networks with firewalls and encryption software is no longer sufficient. We need to develop new architecture and mechanisms to protect the wire-less networks and mobile computing applications. Hence in this paper, we discuss how to identify the intrusion after an anomaly is reported. Simple rules are applied to identify the intruder information and also detect the type of the attack. The identification process is carried by a node called the Monitor node. This node overhears the channel and detects the misbehaviour nodes. There may be more than one monitor node in the whole network. Periodically the monitor nodes are identified in the network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows Section 2 outlines various challenges. Section 3 gives an overview f the attack models Section 4 presents the Intruder Detection Methods and identification rules . Sections 5 gives a set based intrusion detection method. Section 6 outlines the possible responses to the identified attacks. Finally we conclude our paper with some plans for future research.
Challenges
Unlike in fixed networks the mobile adhoc networks needs more security mechanisms. The wireless channel is accessible to both legitimate network users and malicious attackers. Attackers may intrude into the network through the subverted nodes. The network topology is highly dynamic as nodes frequently join or leave the network, and roam in the network. Despite such dynamics, mobile users may request for anytime, anywhere security services as they move from one place to another. Hence a security solution is required which has both broad protection and desirable network performance. The security solution should protect each node in the network and the security of the entire networks relies on the collective protection of all the nodes. The security solution should not be for a single layer in the network. The security solution should protect the network from both the inside and outside intruders into the system. The security scheme adopted by each device has to work within its own resource limitations in terms of energy supply, communication capacity, memory and computation capability. The security solution should encompass all three components of prevention, detection, and reaction that work in concert to guard the system from collapse. The security solution should be practical and affordable in a highly dynamic and resource constrained networking scenario. However an attacker succeeds in infiltrating the security system and causes them to misbehave. Node misbehavior can result in degradation of network performance.
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Hence the system should be monitored for any anomalies and take necessary actions if an anomaly is detected. A system performing these tasks is known as an intrusion detection system (IDS). An ideal IDS should be able to set thresholds for its detection schemes dynamically so that misbehaving nodes cannot easily work around the detection scheme. An attacker may find certain loopholes in the current IDS and tries to attack. Hence these types of flaws in the basic operations must be recognized and raise the security level . The attacker identity must be reported by the IDS. Each monitor node should invoke the security mechanisms when ever necessary and possible.
mIDS Attack Models
Attacks in Mobile Adhoc networks can be categorized as follows.
1. Unfair use of the transmission channel(ATTACK1) 2. Anomalies in Packet Forwarding(ATTACK2)
Unfair use of the transmission channel (ATTACK1)
A node can prevent other nodes in its neighborhood from getting fair share of the transmission channel. This misbehavior can be considered as DoS attacks against the competing neighbors in a contention-based network since the competing neighbors are deprived of their fair share of the transmission channel. Some of the possible methods for unfair use of the transmission channel are as follows:
1) Ignoring the MAC protocol Protocols like 802.11 uses RTS and CTS to notify the immediate neighbors of how long the transmission channel will be reserved for the successful transmission. Such methods minimizes collisions among competing neighbors and try to ensure that all the competing neighbors can get some share of the common channel. But a misbehaving node can generate RTS/CTS at an unacceptable rate by ignoring the backoff mechanism. Hence the competing neighbors cannot get an adequate share of the transmission channel. This imposes a long delay at the output queues and they finally time out and get removed. If the indicated duration (Ti) is less than the actual duration (Ta) taken for successful transmissions, the transmission channel will remain occupied for an additional period, Ta -Ti. The competing neighbors may not be aware of this additional hidden period. As a consequence neighbors trying to access the channel within the hidden period are likely to face unexpected collisions, increase their backoff intervals and hence may not get their share of the channel.
2) Jamming the transmission channel with garbage: Garbage can consist of packets of unknown formats, violating the proper sequence of a transaction (e.g. sending a data packet without exchanging RTS and CTS) or simply random bits used as static noise by misbehaving nodes. Garbage data may result in too many collisions, may consume a significant part of the available Channel capacity or both. Consequently legitimate neighbors may not be able to access the channel properly when needed.
3) Ignoring the bandwidth reservation scheme Nodes in a multi-hop wireless network reserves a slot for transmission channel before initiating a flow. If there is not enough bandwidth, new flows should not be admitted so that existing flows are not choked. A misbehaving node may not abide by this rule and try to push out packets when there is not enough bandwidth left. As a result legitimate nodes may not get fair share of the transmission channel.
4) Malicious flooding:
Deliver unusually large amount of data of control packets to the whole network or some target nodes.
5) Network Partition :
A connected network is partitioned into k (k >= 2) sub networks where nodes in different sub networks cannot communicate even through a route between them actually does exist.
6) Sleep Derivation:
A node is forced to exhaust its battery power.
3.1.2.
Anomalies in Packet Forwarding (ATTACK2) Anomalies in packet forwarding takes the following forms:
• Drop packets: A node may disrupt the normal operation of a network by dropping packets [22] . This type of attack can be classified into two types: (a) Black hole attack and (b) Gray hole attack. Blackhole : All traffic are redirected to a specific node X. X will never forward any traffic at all. In a black hole attack a misbehaving node drops all types of packets (both data and control packets). Gray hole attack: An attacker selectively drops data packets. We refer to this attack as ATTACK2a.
• Delay packet transmissions: A node can give preference to transmitting its own or friends' packets by delaying others' packets. As a result some flows may be not being able to meet their end-to-end delay and jitter requirements. ATTACK2b and ATTACK2c refer to the attacks related to delay and jitter requirements respectively. If these anomalies are not detected, nodes may still use the offending node/nodes in their routes to connect to the remote parts of the network and may not achieve required QoS.
• Wormhole : A tunnel is created between two nodes that can be utilized to secretly transmit packets.
• Packet dropping. A node drops data packets that is supposed to forward. • Routing Loop : A loop is introduced in a route path • Denial -of -Service: A node is prevented from receiving and sending data packets to its destinations.
• Fabricated route messages: Route messages with malicious contents are injected into the network. Specific methods include a) False Source Route : An incorrect route is advertised into the network , setting the route length to be 1 regardless where the destination is.
• Maximum sequence : Modify the sequence field in control messages to the maximum allowed value.
• Cache Poisioning : Information stored in routing tables is either modified , deleted or injected with false information • Selfishness : A node is not serving as a relay to other nodes.
• Rushing : This can be used to improve fabricated route messages.
In severeal routing protocols some route message types have the property that only the message that arrives first is accepted by a recipient. The attacker simply disseminates a malicious control message quickly to block legimate messages that arrive later.
• Spoofing : Inject data or control packets with modified source addresses. mIDS proposes an attack model for the mobile adhoc networks that primarily concentrates on the above mentioned attacks It continuously monitors for these attacks. Whenever the anomaly is reported , mIDS protects the system, without compromising its effectiveness
Intrusion Detection Methods And Related Work
Intrusion detection systems can be classified broadly into two classes:
• Reputation based schemes.
• Incentive based approaches. Reputation based schemes detect misbehaving nodes and notify other nodes of the misbehaving nodes. Incentive based approaches aims to promote positive behavior to foster cooperation instead of relying on participants to report and punish misbehaving nodes. mIDS is a reputation-based system. Zhang et al. [8] [12] have developed a distributed and cooperative intrusion detection system (IDS) where individual IDS agents are placed on each and every node. Each IDS agent runs independently, detects intrusion from local traces and initiates response. The authors have detailed intrusion detection methods for the following attacks: (a) Falsifying route entry in a node's route and (b) Random packet dropping by intermediate nodes.
The random packet dropping detection scheme relies on overhearing transmissions of neighboring nodes. Bhargava and Agrawal [13] have extended the IDS model described in [8] to enhance the security in AODV (Ad-hoc on demand Distance Vector [14] ) routing protocol. Watchdog [18] proposes to monitor packet forwarding on top of source routing protocols like DSR. Watchdog has the limitations of relying on overhearing packet transmissions of neighboring nodes for detecting anomalies in packet forwarding. It assumes symmetric bidirectional connectivity: if A can hear B, B can also hear A. Since the whole path is specified, when node A forwards a packet to the next hop B, it knows B's next hop C. It then overhears the channel for B's transmission to C. If it does not hear the transmission after a timeout, a failure threshold associated with B is increased. If the threshold exceeds a maximum value, A sends a report packet to the source notifying B's misbehavior. Reference [19] follows the same concept but works with distance vector protocols such as ADOV. It adds a next hop field in AODV packets so that a node can be aware of the correct next hop of its neighbors. It also considers more types of attacks, such as packet modification, packet duplication, and packet-jamming DoS attacks. Each independent detection result is signed and flooded; multiple such results from different nodes can collectively revoke a malicious node of its certificate, thus excluding it from the network. Bal Krishnan [21] has proposed a way to detect packet dropping in ad-hoc networks that addresses the problems of receiver collisions, limited transmission power and directional antennas discussed earlier. This scheme (TWOACK) can be added on to a source routing protocol such as DSR. Suppose node A has discovered a route to F with a source route A, B, C, D, E, and F. In TWOACK when B forwards a packet for A, C receives the packet and sends an acknowledgement to A indicating B has forwarded the packet properly. If A does not get an acknowledgement for the packet, it expected to be forwarded by B to C, within a certain timeout period it suspects B to be misbehaving. The same procedure is carried out by every set of three consecutive nodes along the source route. In TWOACK each forwarded packet has to be acknowledged which may contribute to traffic congestion on the routing path. S-TWOACK (Selective TWOACK) reduces this extra traffic by sending a single acknowledgement for a number of packets instead to a single packet.
Detection Methods
Various methods are proposed to detect the intrusion identity. 2) Random Packet Dropping Monitor the same statistics FP as Unconditional Packet Dropping. If the denominator is not zero and FPm is less than a chosen threshold TH_FP (TH_FP < 1) but not zero, the attack is detected as Random Packet Dropping and node m is identified as the attacker. TH_FP is chosen so that 1 -TH_FP is equal to upper bound of the dropping rate that can be tolerated.
3) Selective (Random) Packet Dropping Monitor the statistics LFP (Local Forward Percentage)
LFPs m =packets from s actually being forwarded packets from source s to be forwarded . over a sufficiently long time period L for each source s. If the denominator is not zero and the statistics is zero (un-conditional dropping), the attack is unconditional Packet Dropping targeted at s. Likewise, if the LFP is less than TH_LFP (TH_LFP < 1), the attack is random Packet Dropping targeted at s. In either case, m is identified as the attacker.
4)
Blackhole Monitor the statistics GFP (Global Forward Percentage)
GFPm as the ratio of the total number of packets that are received by M and M should forward to the total number of packets sent by M's 1-hop neighborhood (N(M)) and are not destined for another neighbor or M over a time period of L.. If all such packets are being absorbed by M for a sufficiently long period, or more precisely, if the denominator is not zero and GFP = 1, then an blackhole is detected and M is identiffied as the attacking or misbehaving node. The detection of blackhole may be infeasible if M is malicious and the attacker has total control of M so that the detection modules can be disabled.
Detecting Attack1
mIDS makes the following assumption to detect ATTACK1. In mobile adhoc networks the transmission time is divided into contention period and transmission period. Nodes in a multi-hop wireless network use TDMA/S-TDMA to reserve a slot for transmission channel before initiating a flow. Each node gets a chance to transmit at least once during a frame time. A security mechanism can be found where a node has to digitally sign before reserving the slot. Hence the intruders cannot reserve the slot. If there is not enough bandwidth, new flows should not be admitted so that existing flows are not choked. This enables existing flows to achieve their desired QoS. After the contention period, the nodes are allowed to transmit in the same order of their reservation. An intruder may attack a node X and allow it to misbehave. Due to this misbehavior the performance of the network decreases. Hence a node X after completion of transmitting in its slot time, have to send a special packet identifying its completion of transmission. The predecessor of node X overhears this. If the predecessor node do not hear this special packet after a duration time from X, thinks that X is misbehaving and increments the misbehaving count by one. If the misbehaving count reaches to certain threshold value, then the X is identified as a misbehaving node. The neighbors of node X are reported of this misbehaving node Alternatively let us assume that for each period T, a node X knows that p% of the available link capacity has been allocated by its neighboring nodes where p = L where L is the total link capacity. L should be less than 100% since no system can work at 100% capacity. Now for each period T, X measures the percentage of link capacity r% being used by the neighboring nodes for the admitted flows. It also measures the percentage of link capacity s% being wasted due to collisions, garbage data and flows that did not reserve bandwidth.
If
(r + s) >= L (1) X assumes that, a neighbor or a group of neighbors are accessing the channel unfairly. X increases a non-negative misbehavior counter m_c each time X detects ATTACK1 and decrements it if there is no such misbehavior. If m_c reaches a threshold, X declares its neighborhood misbehaving. Sometimes a neighbor of X may not utilize the whole part of link capacity allocated to an admitted flow. This can happen if the flow does not send packets at a constant bit rate. Hence r can be less than p. Therefore, r < p does not mean that neighbors are not getting fair share of the channel. However, r < p can also be true if a neighbor does not get fair share of the channel.
Detecting Attack2
For a flow f each node, h hops away from the source in the routing path, measures the rate R [f, h] at which it processes packets. At the source, intermediate and destination nodes processing of packets refers to sending, forwarding and receiving packets respectively. h of the source is 0 and it increases for subsequent nodes towards the destination. At the end of each period T, the destination puts R (4) is to prevent any false alarm when some intermediate nodes may drop packets but the end-to-end delivery ratio requirement will still be met. The packet dropping can also be detected through contact scheduling. Contact scheduling is assumed while proposing a solution for mIDS.. That is a node before transmitting knows the address of all the nodes in the path to the destination. Using this path a node transmits the data. The source node encrypts the message in such a way that the decryption is possible only for the destination node and not to the intermediate nodes. The node C decrypts the message in DATA k using the secret key K. Hence only the final destination node can know the secret key and decrypts the message. The intermediate nodes do not know the secret key. They only decrypt the message using the public key and forward the data to the next neighbor in the path. Though hooks are advantageous they suffer with a problem of revealing the destination address. Hence the snakes can be used for forwarding the message to the nodes. In the snake shaped path the address of the final destination can not be revealed.
The size of the onion should not be revealed to the nodes. Each time the node decrypts the message using its public key, the size of the onion is decremented.
Detecting Attack2b
We present two schemes to detect ATTACK2b. The first scheme relies on time synchronization among all nodes. One way to achieve time synchronization in an ad-hoc network is to install GPS (Global Positioning System) on each node. Before sending packets of a flow f the sender puts time-stamps in each packet. Time-stamps can be digitally signed to prevent other nodes from modifying them. When a node in the route of "f" receives a packet from the source, it subtracts the time-stamp in the packet from its current time. Thus a downstream node of "f" computes the delay each packet has encountered since it was sent from the source. Each node averages such delays for a period T. Let the average value be Tavg [f, h] at a downstream node, h hops away from the source. Similar to the detection scheme for ATTACK2a, the destination periodically sends a RSP containing Tavg 
Monitor Idetenfication Method
Mobile adhoc nodes typically have limited battery power, thus it is not eficient to make each node always a monitoring node, especially when the threat level is low. Let a group of nodes form as a set and one among them elected as a monitor node. Let the mobile adhoc network is organized as a collection of such sets , where each set has a monitor node. The responsibility of intrusion detection is performed by the monitor nodes . There are many set-based intrusion detection schemes and set formation algorithms.Set formation using various algorithms in 18-node topology (Head Nodes are shown in Red, Gateway Nodes in Yellow and Member Nodes in Black) Consider the figure 4.0 For comparative analysis the 18 node base topology has been taken from [8] . It is observed that a scheme proposed in [4] results in 9 sets as shown in figure 1b and 5 sets by using scheme proposed in [5] as shown in figure 4c. Each set have the set head, has all other members, known as neighbors, in its 1-hop vicinity. As a special case, a node that cannot be reached by anyone else forms a single node set, or SNC. The size of a set is defined as the number of nodes in the set and is denoted as SC. Every node should have a fair chance to serve as a set head. A nice property of XOR is that as long as one input is random (i.e., from a \well-behaving" node), the output is random. The random values are fully exchanged within the set (SET) and the selection function is computed in a distributed manner, i.e., on each node, to decide the set head..
Monitor Election Protocol
The purpose of this protocol is to randomly select one node in the set as the set head. we discuss the behavior on the i-th node. There are two parts in this protocol.
1. Since the network topology tends to change in an ad hoc network, connections between the elected set head and some citizens' nodes may be broken from time to time. If a link between a citizen Z and a set head H has been broken, Z will check if it is in another set. 
Reactions
Once a malicious node is detected, certain actions are triggered to protect the network from future attacks launched by this node. The reaction component typically is related to the prevention component in the overall security system. For example, the malicious node may have its certificate revoked, or be chosen with smaller probability in future forwarding paths. Based on their scope, the reaction schemes can be categorized as global reaction and end-host reaction. In the former scheme, all nodes in the network react to a malicious node as a whole. In other words, the malicious node is excluded from the network. On the other hand, in the end-host reaction scheme, each node may make its own decision on how to react to a malicious node (e.g., putting this node in its own blacklist or adjusting the confidentiality weight of this node).
Global reaction. The reaction scheme in [19] falls into the global reaction category. It is based on the URSA certification framework [20] . Once multiple nodes in a local neighborhood have reached consensus that one of their neighbors is malicious, they collectively revoke the certificate of the malicious node. Consequently, the malicious node is isolated in the network, as it cannot participate in the routing or packet forwarding operations in the future . End-host reaction. The pathrater in [18] allows each node to maintain its own rating for every other node it knows about. A node slowly increases the rating of well-behaved nodes over time, but dramatically decreases the rating of a malicious node that is detected by its watchdog. Based on the rating, the source always selects the path with the highest average rating. Clearly each node may have a different opinion about whether another node is malicious, and each has its independent reaction accordingly. Reference [17] extends this idea with security protection of the routing messages, as discussed earlier.
Responding To Attack1
If the detection module of X succeeds in identifying the misbehaving node N or the direction of misbehavior (DoM), it takes the following actions:
• X notifies the routing module that it should avoid N or the neighbors towards the DoM in the route discovery process for certain duration.
• X notifies the underlying security module to reauthenticate N or all the neighbors towards DoM.
• If X forwards any packet for an ongoing flow to N or towards the DoM, it notifies the source of the flow to find an alternate route that avoids N or the neighbors of X towards DoM. The detection module of X may detect ATTACK1 but may not identify the misbehaving node or the direction of misbehavior. In this case the responses are as follows:
• X notifies the routing protocol to avoid all its neighbors in the route discovery process a certain duration.
• X notifies the underlying security module to reauthenticate all its neighbors.
• If X forwards any packet for an ongoing flow to any of its neighbors, it notifies the source of the flow to find an alternate route that avoids all the neighbors of X.
Responding To Attack2
If a node X detects a downstream node Y is responsible for ATTACK2 for a flow f, it takes the following actions:
• Notifies the routing module to find an alternate route avoiding Y for the flow f.
• Notifies its routing module and those of the neighbors of Y to avoid Y for a certain period for any new flow that has similar QoS requirements as f.
Conclusion
We have proposed an IDS, referred to as mIDS, for wireless networks. mIDS can detect if nodes are getting their fair share of the transmission channel. It also detects packet drops or delays that violate the respective flow requirements. mIDS rely on overhearing packet transmissions of neighboring nodes that makes it an effective system in networks where nodes use different transmission power and directional antennas for different neighbors. mIDS does not require setting up various thresholds manually; rather it can select them dynamically. In future we want to implement all the causes of ATTACK1 and ATTACK2. We would also like to implement a fully functional response system that would incorporate all the features outlined in Sections 4,5,6.
